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OPINION
                               
PER CURIAM
Neema Patel, a citizen of India, petitions for review of
the BIA decision upholding the denial of her motion to
terminate removal proceedings.  Her petition presents the
question of whether the confidentiality provisions of section
245A(c)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
apply to an application for employment authorization submitted
by the child of a Legal Immigration Family Equity (“LIFE”) Act
adjustment-of-status applicant.  For the reasons that follow, we
    1 INA § 245A is titled “Adjustment of status of certain
entrants before January 1, 1982, to that of person admitted for
lawful permanent residence.”  The confidentiality provisions
of that section read:  
3
agree with the BIA that they do not, and we will deny the
petition for review.
I
In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (“IRCA”), which created a legalization program
that “allow[ed] existing undocumented aliens to emerge from
the shadows” and gain legal residency in the United States.
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483 (1991).
IRCA provided undocumented aliens who had resided
continuously in the United States since January 1982 with the
opportunity to apply for legal resident status.  In 2000, IRCA
was modified by the LIFE Act and its amendments.  See LIFE
Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1504, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-325 (2000); LIFE Act, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 1104, 114
Stat. 2762, 2762A-146-49 (2000).  The LIFE Act, as amended,
gave class members in three class-action cases a new
opportunity to apply for lawful permanent residency.  See LIFE
Act Amendments § 1503(a); LIFE Act § 1104.  Additionally, it
permitted the spouse and unmarried children of an eligible alien
to stay in the United States and obtain work authorization.  See
LIFE Act Amendments § 1504; 8 C.F.R. § 245a.31.
To encourage eligible aliens to seek lawful residency
status, section 1104(c)(5) of the LIFE Act afforded applicants
protection under INA § 245A(c)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(5)].1
Except as provided in this paragraph, neither the Attorney
General, nor any other official or employee of the Department
of Justice, or bureau or agency thereof, may- -
(i) use the information furnished by the applicant pursuant to
an application filed under this section [i.e., for adjustment of
status] for any purpose other than to make a determination on
the application, for enforcement of paragraph (6), or for the
preparation of reports to Congress under section 404 of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986;
(ii) make any publication whereby the information furnished
by any particular applicant can be identified; or
(iii) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and
employees of the Department or bureau or agency or, with
respect to applications filed with a designated entity, that
designated entity, to examine individual applications.
INA § 245A(c)(5)(A).  The Agency implemented a regulation
containing substantially similar language at 8 C.F.R. section
245a.21.
4
Section 1104(c)(5) reads, in pertinent part:  “Subsection (c)(5)
of [INA] section 245A shall apply to information furnished by
an eligible alien described in [LIFE Act section 1104(b)]
pursuant to any application filed under such section 245A or this
section . . . .”
II
Patel entered the United States in 1988 without
    2 There was some debate before the IJ as to whether Patel’s
filing constituted a request for benefits under section 1104(b)
or section 1504(b) of the LIFE Act Amendments Family
Unity Provisions.  After an extended colloquy, Patel, through
counsel, stated that her work authorization application was a
request for benefits solely under section 1504(b).  See A.R.
51-61.
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inspection.  Patel’s father later submitted an application under
LIFE Act section 1104 for an adjustment to lawful permanent
resident status.  While that application was pending, Petitioner
filed an application for work authorization under section 1504
of the LIFE Act Amendments Family Unity Provisions.2  Her
application was denied and, based on her admissions in the
application, removal proceedings were initiated against her.  
Before the IJ, Patel filed a motion to terminate the
removal proceedings.  She admitted that she was ineligible for
adjustment of status under section 1104(b), but argued that the
confidentiality provisions of INA § 245A(c)(5) prevented the
government from using her section 1504(b) employment
application for the purpose of removal proceedings.  The IJ
denied Patel’s motion and ultimately granted her voluntary
departure.  Patel appealed, arguing that the IJ incorrectly denied
her motion to terminate the removal proceedings.  The BIA
upheld the IJ’s decision, reasoning that, on its face, section
1104(c)(5) applies only to an alien’s application for adjustment
of residency status under section 1104(b) of the LIFE Act.  Patel
then filed a petition for review.
III
6We have jurisdiction over Patel’s petition for review
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Because the BIA issued its own
opinion, we review its decision rather than that of the IJ.  See Li
v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, we
also look to the decision of the IJ to the extent that the BIA
defers to, or adopts, the IJ’s reasoning.  See Chavarria v.
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review the
Agency’s legal conclusions de novo, subject to established
principles of deference.  See Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279,
282 (3d Cir. 2004).
At the outset, we note that the question whether the
Agency correctly interpreted the INA’s confidentiality
provisions as inapplicable to applications for LIFE Act Family
Unity benefits appears to be a question of first impression in this
Circuit, and we have not identified a precedential opinion by
another Court of Appeals that conclusively determines the issue.
Our inquiry is governed by the framework set forth in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).  
[U]nder Chevron, we must first determine if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue
of law in the case, using traditional tools of statutory
construction to determine whether Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue.  If
congressional intent is clear, the inquiry ends, as both the
agency and the court must give effect to the plain
language of the statute.  Where, however, a statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
court proceeds to step two, where it inquires whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
7of the statute.
Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Here, we
conclude that the question at issue can be resolved at Chevron’s
first step.
“A basic tenet of statutory construction is that we ‘must
begin with . . . the assumption that the ordinary meaning of the
[statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.’”  Id. at 155-56 (quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).  Section 1104(c)(5)
of the LIFE Act applies the confidentiality provisions of INA
§ 245A(c)(5) to “information furnished by an eligible alien
described in [LIFE Act section] 1104(b) pursuant to any
application filed under [INA §] 245A or this section.”  The
ordinary meaning of “pursuant to” is “in compliance with; in
accordance with; under.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.
2004).  Therefore the plain language of section 1104(c)(5)
makes clear that the confidentiality provisions apply only to a
filing submitted by an alien described in LIFE Act section
1104(b), and only insofar as the filing is an application for
adjustment of residency status.  Thus, there is no room for us to
conclude that Congress intended to extend the protection of INA
§ 254A(c)(5) to any filing other than an application by an alien
for adjustment of residency status.  Cf. Perez v. INS, 72 F.3d
256, 259-60 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasizing in somewhat different
circumstances that, under IRCA, information was confidential
only to the extent that it was furnished in an application for
adjustment of residency status).
Patel conceded that she was ineligible for relief under
section 1104(b), and the application that she submitted was an
8application for employment authorization under the Family
Unity Provisions – not an application to adjust her residency
status.  Thus, the contents of her application were not
confidential under the LIFE Act.  And Patel points to no
language within the LIFE Act Family Unity Provisions, or
anywhere else, that establishes a right to confidentiality in a
derivative application for benefits.  See LIFE Act § 1504; 8
C.F.R. §§ 245a.30-.37.  Inasmuch as Patel sought only
derivative LIFE Act benefits through her father under section
1504(b) of the Act, the Agency correctly reasoned that the
information in her work authorization application was not
protected.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
